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Introduction
This paper concentrates on the link between the social capital of local representatives in Hungary and
the democratic performance of representatives  and of their institution, the local government. The
main questions which this paper addresses are as follows: Do local representatives have more
democratic values? Do local representatives with more social capital act more democratically? Do
local governments in which councilors have more social capital have better democratic performance?
This can be summarized in one question: Does the social capital of local representatives contribute to
the institutional performance of local governments?
One way to answer these questions is the use of social capital research. Putnam's Making Democracy
Work (1993) initiated a new research agenda on the political consequences of social capital. Although
there is no single concept of social capital, it clearly refers to a social phenomenon, which is outside
the realm of politics but has an impact on political life. The main message of Putnam (1993) was that
horizontally organized, civic society furthers social capital, which facilitates co-operation and yields
good governance. Several critiques (e.g. Levi 1996, Brehm and Rahn 1997, Foley and  Edwards 1996,
Jackman and Miller 1996) pointed to the under-specified nature of the exact mechanisms through
which social organization and institutional performance are linked. In fact, Putnam (1993:182)
mentions briefly two possible reasons underlying this relationship. (1) Citizens in civic regions can
make effective demands to governments through their collective acts: “citizens in civic communities
expect better government and (in part through their own efforts) they get it”. (2) Both citizens and
their political leaders in civic regions have the social capability to co-operate and treat others as
equals: “the performance of representative government is facilitated by the social infrastructure of
civic communities and the democratic values of both officials and citizens”. This  point comes up in
other places in the book, arguing in favor of, for, the responsible character of leaders in civic
communities (Putnam 1993:88). Conspicuously enough, the problem of the social capital of decision-
makers is largely under-researched.
Politicians join social groups and networks for two reasons. Like 'ordinary people', they may have a
desire for social life in which they can achieve a personal satisfaction. On the other hand, politicians
also use their social connections instrumentally by using them as means of extending political support.
Both motivations can lead to two side effects that are beneficial for democratic practice. First,
interactions with equals in horizontally organized social groups can develop a political culture that
favors democratic solutions. Social capital theory argues that participants in the life of social networks
unintentionally take up virtues such as tolerance, social trust, respect for social and political equality
and the like. Politicians with more democratic values are more likely to make more effort at
consultation with citizens. Second, interactions in social groups may also strengthen interpersonal
accountability. Even nonpolitical groups can provide an opportunity for citizens to request account for
the actions of politicians. This accountability implies answerability rather than institutionalized
enforcement (for the distinction of the two types of accountability, see Schedler 1999). Still, the
importance of reward and punishment caused by interpersonal accountability must not be understated,
especially in small-scale local societies. The negative consequences of a bad account can be both
social (the loss of reputation in local society) and political (the loss of political support). It can be
argued that the realization of these two potentially democratic effects of group linkages depends on
the motivation of the (local) politician. Purely social motivation, especially with long socialization,
favors the development of a democratic political culture. However, the often non-political character of
these groups and the non-political motivation of joining them makes interpersonal accountability less
likely. Political motivation, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of political accountability,
since group membership serves as a means to extend political support. Consequently, politically
motivated members of social groups behave in a different way than those who simply want to spend
their time agreeably: they politicize their social networks, make political arguments, promise policies
and so forth. Such a reliance on group linkages make them more vulnerable to requests of accounts.
This paper seeks to shed more light on the mechanisms through which group linkages of local
politicians have an effect on the political performance of local governments. It is divided into five
sections. The first section explores the amount  of social capital among local politicians and sets out to
demonstrate the factors that influence membership in a social organization. In this research the
concept of social capital refers to ‘social  connectedness’, (imperfectly) indicated by membership in a
civil society organization (CSO). Since many authors identify social capital with interpersonal trust,
analysis will also control for social trust where possible. Social capital is claimed to make both
citizens and leaders more democratic. The second section, therefore, examines the relationship
between social capital and interpersonal trust, trust within council, attitudes toward social equality,
political equality, political participation and the existing political system. The two subsequent sections
concentrate on the democratic impact of the social capital of local decision-makers. Through
democratic practice or democratic performance, this research identifies the realization of norms such
as openness, transparency, fairness and responsiveness. When assessed, measures will concentrate on
the effort of decision-makers at a two-way communication between citizens and decision-makers, as
indicators of the norms listed above. The focus of the third section is on the effect of individual social
capital on the political performance of individual local politicians. The fourth section analyzes the
relationship between the democratic performance of local government and the aggregated social
capital of local representatives. Finally, a short concluding section draws up the balance sheet of the
evidence presented in the paper and outlines some opportunities for further research.
The data used in the paper were generated in two surveys organized by the Tocqueville Research
Center and funded by the Local Government Initiative (Open Society Institute). The first survey was
conducted with the chief executive officers of 650 Hungarian local governments between February
and March 2001. This dataset was weighted in such a way that the distribution corresponded with the
distribution of all local governments in Hungary. The second survey was a mail survey with 1786
local government representatives in Hungary between March and June 2001. These data were not
weighted. New data from other countries will be available during the course of 2002. This will
provide an opportunity to retest the claims of this paper and widen its argument.
I. The Profile of the Socially Active Councilor
This is an explorative chapter which attempts to describe the level and determinants of the social
participation of local government representatives in Hungary. Social participation is operationalized
as a function of membership in civil society organizations (CSOs). The question was formulated in
the Local Representative Survey in the following way: “Are you personally a member of any
association, foundation, or other civil society organization?” Over half (56.1 percent) of local
councilors are current members of a social organization.
A second question asked in how many organizations the respondent was a member. Most of the
respondents are members of only one (46%) or two (31%) organizations. Members of more than five
organizations are rare. This is undoubtedly a matter of time management, with councilors having to
choose between competing commitments.
In most cases (80%), local representatives hold an office, meaning they have a role as an officer, in
the social organization to which they belong. This can be explained both by the stronger of local
politicians in local societies and the small size of most civil society organizations. Local politicians
are invariable held in high-esteem, and spend their time attempting to earn the respect of the local
community. The fact that most social organizations are small means that a charismatic, well-respected
person will play a leading role in the organization.
Table 1: Number of memberships and offices in civil society organizations
Proportion of
members in the
sample
Number of CSO
memberships
among CSO
members
Number of
memberships in
CSOs independent of
local government
funding
Proportion of
office-holders
among CSO
members
0 43,9% 20,5% 20,3%
1 26,1% 45,8% 40,4% 53,3%
2 17,5% 30,8% 22,7% 18,3%
3 8,6% 15,2% 10,4% 5,8%
4 2,5% 4,4% 3,5% ,7%
5 9,3% 1,6% 1,5% 1,2%
6 0,6% 1,0% 0,7% ,3%
7 0,2% 0,8% 0,2%
8 0,3% 0,3%
9 0,1% 0,5%
10 0,1% 0,2%
Total 100,0% 100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
N 1078 605 547 585
Source: LRS 2001
Local politicians often participate in social organizations because of their position in local
government. Hence, it is worth asking the question, which appeared in the survey, as to how many of
the social organizations of which local representatives are members rely on local government
subsidies as their main source of (financial) support? This allows us to see membership in so-called
'independent' CSOs. One fifth of respondents who are members of social organizations are, in fact,
members of CSOs that depend financially on local government. Of those who are members of more
than one social organization, a high percentage (80%) include in their membership portfolio at least
one independent CSO.
Typically, socially active councilors spend between one and ten hours per week on activities of their
CSOs. Every ninth respondent proved to be very active in a social organization, putting in more than
20 hours work per week.
Table 2: Time spent on CSO activities
Time spent on CSO activities
No time spent 17,8%
1-10 hours per week 57,6%
11-20 hours per week 13,6%
More than 20 hours per week 11,0%
Total 100,0%
N 589
Source: LRS 2001
What profit do representatives gain from being involved in the life of civil society organizations? A
question in the representative survey listed four possible political advantages a politician can obtain
from social participation: (i) Information. Access to first-hand information was the most frequently
selected category (59%). (ii) Networking. A politician always has an interest in monitoring public
opinion and getting feedback on political decisions. Respondents found networking almost as
important (54%) as information. Building up connections is a crucial precondition of political success.
The other two options, focusing on political education benefits, were less frequently chosen. (iii)
`Management skills`. Participation in a civil society organization is a good school for learning how to
conciliate various and often diverging interests, and for how to reach a decision through the consent of
major stakeholders. 37 percent of respondents claimed they had learned conflict-management skills in
civil organizations. (iv) `Organizational skills.` Strangely enough, the category that proved to be the
least popular (23%) referred to a basic competence, organizational skills. Such skills can easily be
learnt in civil society organizations and are very useful in practical politics.
Table 3: Uses of civil society membership for local representatives
In which of the following ways does your participation in
civil organizations help your work as a representative?
Percent of respondents
selecting the answer
Networking 53.7%
More information on what residents think 59.4%
Organizational, managerial experience 23.4%
Better able to handle conflicts 37.2%
Source: LRS 2001
Multivariate analysis of CSO membership
What determines the membership of local representatives in civil society organizations? To answer
this question, Table 4 shows four statistical models in which a number of potentially useful variables
are included. All models include the population of municipality as a basic control variable. Model 1
includes demographic features of respondents (age, gender, and education). Model 2 adds political
variables (party membership, mayoral status, and political experience) and parents’ membership
(indicating early socialization and elite reproduction) to the previous factors. Model 3 includes
optimism regarding the future following Uslaner’s (1999) theory. Finally, Model 4 provides the
opportunity to control for the cultural dimension of social capital, that is, interpersonal generalized
trust.
Model 1 contains three major demographic variables: age, gender and education. The older a
representative, the more likely his or her membership in a civil society organization. Of the
respondents, men are 1.7 times more likely to participate in civil society organizations than women.
Finally, educated representatives (who finished at least secondary school) are 1.8 times more likely to
be members of a CSO.
Model 2, however, shows that demography is less important than it appears at first sight. The age of
representatives turned out to be unimportant when political factors (especially previous political
experience) were included into the analysis. The gender gap also seems to be explained by political
variables. Membership in a political party is the best predictor of membership in a social organization:
party members are almost four times more likely to also join a civil society organization. Previous
political experience, gained in the previous regime or in the present system, also makes CSO
membership more likely. Cultural pattern of participatory culture can be inherited: those whose
parents had an office in social or political organization are 1.7 times more likely to join a CSO.
Uslaner  (1999) seems to be right since optimistic respondents are more likely to have CSO
membership. The variable of optimism somewhat increases the explanatory power of the model,
without seriously affecting the weights of other variables in Model 3. However, mainstream social
capital researchers are also correct, since interpersonal trust has a clear effect on membership, which
does not make optimism (or other variables) insignificant in Model 4.
Many CSOs in Hungary are dependent on local government, mostly in financial matters. In Model 5,
the dependent variable is membership of social organizations that are independent of local
government funding. There is one major change in Model 5, compared to Model 4, that the mayoral
status lost its significance. Since mayors often become board members in the CSOs of local
government, this result is quite well interpretable.
Table 4: Determinants of social capital (odds ratios of logistic regression analysis)
Dependent variable: CSO membership Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Education (finished secondary school) 1.8*** 1.6*** 1.5*** 1.4*** 1.7***
Age 1.01*** 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Gender (woman) 0.6*** 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
Political  party membership 3.8*** 3.5*** 3.4*** 3.1***
Mayor 1.8** 1.6** 1.8** 1.4
Political experience before 1990 1.3*** 1.3*** 1.3*** 1.2*
Political experience in local
government
1.3*** 1.3*** 1.3*** 1.3***
Participation of parents 1.7*** 1.6*** 1.6*** 1.6***
Optimism 1.3*** 1.3*** 1.2***
Social trust 1.3*** 1.2**
Population of municipality 1.0*** 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Negelkerke’s  R2 .14 .25 .28 .29 .28
Percent  correct prediction statistic 65% 70% 70% 71% 70%
Significance of Wald-statistic: * p<0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p<0.01; N=931
Conclusion
We can conclude that an analysis of the type of local representative involved in social participation,
through membership in social organizations, provides some concrete and interesting findings. Over
half of Hungarian local representatives join (mostly one or two) civil society organizations, in which
they typically have an office and, in most cases, one of them is independent of local government
subsidies. Membership is more than symbolic for most local representatives, since they invest a
certain amount of time in social activities.
Representatives believe that CSO membership is politically profitable in terms of networking
opportunities and improved information-flow. Developmental effects (organizational experience and
conflict-management) are less important for local politicians than political uses. Although this
contradicts the claims of social capital research, such a self-report cannot be treated as evidence
supporting or rejecting the hypotheses of social capital theory.
Multivariate analysis shows that a crucial personal resource, human capital (measured by education
and, partly, parents’ membership), makes people more sociable and, probably, more interested in
social cooperation. The importance of party membership and political experience indicates that the
motivation of local representatives to join social organization is not limited to the fulfillment of needs
for social life and interest-articulation. The findings on the uses of CSO membership and the
significance of political variables point to a mixture of social and political reasons for joining civil
society organizations.
Evidence supports the claims on the importance of cultural characteristics in social participation.
There is, however, a causality riddle here, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
II. Civic Virtues and Social Capital of Local Representatives
A central claim of the social capital literature is that there is  a significant association between
horizontal networks embedded in  civil society and ‘civic virtues’, that is, interpersonal trust,
solidarity, tolerance of the views of others, willingness to deliberate,  active participation in public
affairs, respect for social and  political equality, and the like. (For a forceful exposition of  the
argument, see Putnam 1993: 86-91.) Face-to-face social relationships,  as the theory goes, have a
developmental effect on individuals,  making them more civic. Civic values, norms and attitudes are
claimed  to form the basis of democratic society and, consequently, contribute  to good governance.
This section tests the developmental hypothesis  in the case of local representatives. Membership in
civil society  organizations will be related to social trust, intra-elite trust,  democratic legitimacy and
respect for social equality, political  equality, and political participation of citizens with a control  for
other potential explanatory factors.
Interpersonal trust
According to the social capital argument,  participation in social organizations promotes cooperation
among  equals, which leads to mutual respect and trust. This claim is  not new, of course, and was
empirically supported in the Civic  Culture (Almond and Verba 1963) as early as the 1960s. Putnam
(1993)  repeated this argument and provided additional evidence. Uslaner  (1999) offers an alternative
approach, arguing that trust depends  on optimism for the future, and not civic organizations.
"Optimism leads  to generalized trust, which promotes civic activism, which creates  a prosperous
community, leading to increasing optimism. Pessimistic  people trust only their own kind." In his
view, optimistic  people are more willing to join social organizations and be trusting. Thus, the
relationship between generalized interpersonal  trust and membership is spurious.
Interpersonal generalized  trust was measured on the basis of agreement with the following  statement
(Q45ai): “Most people are simply vile and are looking  to exploit the others.” (The seven-point scale
has been reversed  and normalized to express trust and to be appropriate for regression  analysis.) As
Model 1 to 3 in Table 5 shows, membership in a social  organization has a significant effect, even if
five other variables  are added in Model 3. Optimism does not decrease the weight of  membership;
rather it has an independent effect (Model 2). Age  and education also contribute to social trust
(Model 3).
Time  is needed for the inculcation of civic values. Respondents with  CSO membership were divided
into two groups: those who had an office  before their election and those who have lately received
such a  function. If the theory is correct, ‘old participants’ have  more trust in others than ‘new
participants’. Model 5 clearly  rejects this claim; actually, new office-holders expressed more  trust
than old ones. This supports the hypothesis of an exogenous  factor that encourages both trust and
membership. The low weight  of optimism does not argue for its importance.
The last  row of the table indicates that these explanatory variables cannot  explain much of the level
of trust.
Table 5: Social capital and interpersonal trust (regression analysis)
Dependent  variable: Interpersonal trust Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CSO membership .18*** .17*** .13***  
Old office-holder in CSO    .08**
New office-holder in CSO    .12***
Optimism  .09** .09** .09***
Level of education   .11*** .13***
Age   .07** .09**
Gender   .02 .02
Population of municipality .08** .07** .04 .04
Adjusted  R2 .04 .05 .07 .07
Significance of t-statistic:  * p<0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.01; N=950
Intra-elite trust
Social capital theory argues that social activity  in horizontally organized groups creates trust, which
in turn facilitates cooperation among decision-makers. Social capital is consequently  expected to
increase mutual trust in the representative bodies.
Two  questions measured trust in fellow politicians. The first gauged  in-group trust (“How much trust
do you place in the promises  made by those who belong to your group of representatives or by  those
with whom you usually vote in accord?”) and the second  assessed out-group trust (“How much trust
do you place in the  promises made by those who belong to a different group of representatives  or by
those with whom you usually have a serious difference of  opinion?”). Two sets of linear regression
analyses tested the  effect of a number of potential explanatory variables on bonding  and bridging
intra-elite trust. In addition to demographics (gender,  age, education), political characteristics (mayor,
party member,  political experience, and left and right), a special set of variables  (Q24) are used to
assess the social relationships of council members.  Four questions were raised on the number of
fellow councilors (a)  who are friends or relatives, (b) with whom the respondent has  a professional
relationship, (c) with whom the respondent cooperates  in social organization, and (d) who the
respondent knew before  his or her election to the municipality council.
One can  draw some major conclusions from the findings presented in Table  6. Generalized,
interpersonal trust is consistently a good predictor  of intra-elite trust. All else being equal,
representatives who  trust in others are more likely to trust their fellow politicians’  promises than
those who have less generalized social trust. Optimism,  on the other hand, predicts in-group trust
better than out-group  trust, which is contradictory to theory. Membership in social organization  has
no significant weight when other cultural variables are included. This  does not reject the social
capital hypothesis, since it claims  the direct effect of cultural phenomena and social connections.
Surprisingly,  cooperation with fellow representatives in social organization  has no effect on intra-
council trust. Less surprisingly, friendship  and longer acquaintance have a significant positive effect
on cooperative  attitudes. (It must be emphasized that social trust has an effect  even if these social
connections are controlled for.) Party membership  does not increase trust in members of the same
faction, but has  a highly significant and negative effect on trust in members of  other factions. The
interpretation of the weights of party sympathies and  political experience certainly requires more
analysis.
Finally,  the relationship between social capital and trust within the political  elite was tested by
means of agreement with the following statement  (Q45ag): “It is dangerous to make deals with one’s
political  enemies as it will lead to conflicts in one’s own political camp.”  (The scale has been
reversed to indicate readiness of cooperation.)  This allows the expression of general attitudes by
disregarding  the concrete persons in the milieu of the respondent. Model 9 shows  that the only
significant variable is interpersonal trust and neither  optimism nor membership has importance. This
result is the same  as one can find in the previous models.
Table 6 Social capital and intra-council trust (regression analysis)
Dependent
variable:
Trust  in representatives in  own faction Trust  in representatives outside
own faction
Attitude to
cooperation
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model
5
Model
6
Model
7
Model
8
Model 9
CSO
membership
.11***  .05 .04 .05  -.00 .02 -.00
Optimism  .11*** .10*** .07*  .04 .04 .06* -.05
Social trust  .22*** .22*** .20***  .22**
*
.23*** .23**
*
.20***
Friendship
with fellow
politicians
   .13***    .09** -.03
Professional
contacts with
fellow
politicians
   .00    .03 .02
Cooperation
in CSO with
fellow
politicians
   .06    -.00 .02
Long
acquaintance
with fellow
politicians
   .09***    .06* -.02
Political
party
membership
   .06    -
.18**
*
.05
Mayor    -.02    .00 .01
Political
experience
before  1990
   -.13***    -.03 .00
Political
experience in
local
government
   .07*    .01 .02
Support for
leftist parties
   .13****    .11**
*
-.02
Support for
rightist
parties
   .05    -.07* .03
Participation
of parents
   .06    .01 -.02
Level  of
education
   -.00    -.01 .01
Age    -.04    -.03 .03
Gender    -.04    .04 .06
Population
of
municipality
.02 .00 .00 .05 -
.17***
-
.19**
*
-
.19***
-.06 -.10**
Adjusted  R2 .01 .07 .07 .13 .03 .08 .07 .14 .04
Significance  of t-statistic: * p<0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.01; N=786
However,  even the final models do not explain much of the variance in intra-elite  trust (13%, 14%
and 4%, respectively). Many idiosyncratic reasons  might influence the actual level of mutual trust in
municipality  councils.
Civic values
According  to social capital theory, both citizens and leaders have a distinctive  set of civic values in
horizontally organized communities. Associations  are claimed to instill values such as social and
political equality,  support for citizen participation and democratic legitimacy. The  regression models
in Table 7 show the effect of the potentially  explanatory variables on these values.
Support for social  equality is measured by the degree of agreement with two statements  (Q45u:
“Discrepancies in salaries should be continually reduced.”  and Q45r: “In every situation poor people
should be given more  opportunities than rich people.”) While membership in social  organization has
a significant relationship in Model 1, it disappears  when cultural variables and education are also
included (Model  2). What really deserves attention is the negative direction  of weights. All else
being equal, representatives with high social  trust are less supportive of equality in society. High
social capital works against equality. Generally speaking,  optimistic, trust and educated people do not
want to share their  relative wealth with others, probably because they belong to the  group of
winners.
Political equality was measured by an  index composed of five statements (Q45c: “Every citizen
should  have an equal chance to influence government policy.”; Q45m:  “Few people really know
what is in their best interests in the  long run.”; Q45p: “It will always be necessary to have a few
strong, able people actually running everything.”; Q45w: “In  this complicated world the only way we
can know what is going on  is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.”; Q45ae:  “Certain
people are better qualified to run this country due  to their traditions and family background.”). The
weight of CSO membership  in Model 1 becomes much weaker in Model 2 in which the powerful
variable of social trust is included. Members of political parties  are committed to the value of
political equality, while the supporters  of rightist parties favor political equality significantly less.
Attitudes  toward political participation are assessed by means of an index  that contained five
statements (Q45a: “The complexity of modern  day issues requires that only the more simple
questions should  be considered publicly.”; Q45f: “Widespread participation in  decision-making
often leads to undesirable conflicts.”; Q45i:  “Most decisions should be left to the judgement of
experts.”;  Q45j: “Only those who are fully informed on the issues should  vote.”; Q45o:
“Participation of the people is not necessary  if decision-making is left in the hands of a few trusted
competent  leaders.”). In a similar way to the previous regression analyses, the  effect of CSO
membership (Model 5) disappears when social trust  steps in (Model 6). Party members recognize the
importance of citizen  participation better than others. One can notice some other significant
relationships that call for more analysis.
Support for  the existing political system is measured by agreement with two  statements, one about
democracy in general (Q45al: “Democracy  is not perfect, but it is still the best possible form of
government  for Hungary.”) and the other about the local government system  in particular (Q45aa:
“The new local governments do a better  job than the councils of pre-1990.”). Those who have social
capital,  trust and optimism feel a deeper legitimacy of the political system  than those whose social
capital, trust and optimism are more limited.  Ex-communists and leftist respondents have
significantly less support  for the present political system. This might be explained by the  fact that
former communists and liberals were in opposition in  the national parliament at the time of the data
collection.
Table 7: Social capital and civic values (regression analysis)
 Social  equality Political  equality Political
participation
System
legitimacy
 Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model 4 Model
5
Model 6 Model
7
Model
8
CSO membership -
.11***
-.01 .13**
*
.07* .06* -.02 .19*** .08**
Optimism  -
.13***
 -.04  -.02  .18***
Social trust  -
.12***
 .19***  .23***  .18***
Political party
membership
 .05  .14***  .11***  -.03
Mayor  -.00  .00  .02  -.01
Political  experience
before  1990
 .03  -.02  .11**  -
.11***
Political experience in
local  government
 -.07**  .02  -.01  .07**
Support for leftist parties  -.01  .03  -.07**  -.08**
Support for rightist
parties
 -.07**  -
.10****
 -.08**  .19***
Participation of parents  .00  .02  -.02  .01
Level of education  -
.23***
 .04  .02  .04
Age  .06  -.01  -.03  .02
Gender  -.00  -.02  -.07**  -.05
Population of
municipality
-.05 -.02 .08** .01 -
.12***
-.06 -.04** .04
Adjusted  R2 .01 .12 .02 .07 .02 .08 .04 .20
Significance of t-statistic:  * p<0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.01; N=786
Conclusion
The findings presented here are rather mixed. Social participation,  indicated by membership in a civil
society organization, is clearly  linked to the amount of trust respondents have in others. Nonetheless,
the time spent in social organizations does not have an effect  on the level of generalized social trust.
Social trust apparently  has a strong influence on the trust representatives have in fellow  councilors,
and the social and political values tested here. Since  CSO membership has no significant effect,
further research should  clarify to what extent a ‘membership - social trust - intra-elite  trust’ logic has
validity. In conclusion, membership in a civil  society organization does not have much effect on civic
virtues, except for social trust and system legitimacy. Interpersonal generalized trust,  however,
always has significance.
III. Political Performance and Social Capital of Local Representatives
Hypotheses
Representatives  are elected to speak and act on behalf of their voters. This requirement  is not
absolute, since elected politicians have the right and duty  to decide on a rational basis, taking broader
and longer-term interests  into account. While responsiveness is not absolute, democracy requires  a
lively contact between the elected and electors. Therefore, a representative  who does not make efforts
to recognize citizens’ wants and needs  is not a democratic leader.
This chapter focuses on the  effect of membership in social organizations on local politicians’
activities to consult with their voters. The previous argument  of this paper allows three hypotheses on
the possible link between  social capital, measured as CSO membership, and representation.  While
the first two focus on two potential mechanisms (political  culture and social control) presented by
social capital research,  the third argues that there is in fact no relationship between  social capital and
political performance.
1. The political culture argument. One of the (politically) exogenous hypotheses suggests the
importance of political culture as an intervening variable. Socially  active politicians are engaged
in cooperation. The experience of  pluralism leads to a deeper recognition of others and a
willingness  to listen to others’ interests and deliberate with them. This,  in turn, results in a more
favorable attitude toward the inclusion  of citizens in the democratic decision-making process.
Such an attitude  encourages representatives to spend more effort on keeping in contact  with their
voters.
2. The interpersonal accountability argument. The  second hypothesis claims that group linkages of
local politicians  are important because face-to-face contacts imply the frequent  opportunity for
fellow members in the CSO to request account for  the actions of their representatives. To avoid
shaming, local politicians perform  better in representing their voters. Social control is an
intervening  variable between social capital and democratic performance.
3. The political  ambition argument. The third hypothesis assumes that politicians  join social
organizations to extend their political resources.  Politicians who seek political support in local
society are also  more likely to lay more stress on active contacts with voters.  Consequently, a
positive association is hypothesized between social  participation and representative activities, but
this is regarded  as a spurious relationship, since both are influenced by the desire  for more public
support.
All three hypotheses predict  a positive, significant relationship between membership in social
organizations and representation activities, but they assume different  variables that connect the two
factors. The three hypotheses are  not mutually exclusive. The goal of this chapter is to test this
general  prediction and, as far as data allow, the validity of the three  hypotheses.
Models of statistical analysis
Democratic  performance as consultation efforts is operationalized by an index  of activities. The LRS
questionnaire contained questions on four  activities concerning communication with citizens: forum
to voters  (Q31); office hours to voters (Q29); publishing articles on public  issue (Q32); and giving
interviews (Q33). An index can be constructed  from the four items (Cornbach-alpha = .74). The
index is the dependent  variable in the following regression models. To increase robustness,  the
regression analysis was repeated for each component variable  of the index (tables not shown here).
Six linear regression  models were built to reach the analytical objectives of this chapter.
Municipality size, operationalized as the number of inhabitants  in 1999 according to the Hungarian
Central Statistical Office, and three demographic variables  (age, gender and the level of education)
are basic variables and  are included in all regression models. Model 1 includes membership  in a
social organization (dummy variable) and the basic control  variables.
Model 2 includes political culture variables.  It includes the attitude of respondents toward political
participation  to control variables. The index of political participation attitudes  is composed of five
political culture questions (Q45a, Q45f, Q45i,  Q45j, Q45o). If the political culture hypothesis is
correct, Model  2 will show a decreasing effect of CSO membership.
Model  3 adds a proxy measure of social control in CSOs to the analysis.  If fellow members in CSOs
request account for political positions  and actions, their opinion should be important for politicians.
The degree to which local politicians' opinion is influenced by  CSOs refers to the strength of their
accountability mechanisms.  A question (Q40g) asked respondents to evaluate the extent to which
CSOs have an impact on their political standpoint. This measure  is far from being perfect, but it can
be used for a first attempt  to test the accountability hypothesis.
Model 4 includes  four variables referring to political motivation. Membership in  a political party is a
sign of political ambition. Becoming a mayor  usually requires much work, and only highly-motivated
politicians  can survive the selection process. Participation in political education  clearly refers to
political ambitions and may teach the importance  of the frequent contacts with citizens as a means of
political  survival. Finally, political competition, operationalized as the  number of factions in the
representative body of the local government,  was added as a major obstacle for non-motivated
would-be politicians.  If the third hypothesis is correct, the addition of these variables should  make
the effect of CSO membership less significant.
Model  5 includes all the variables at once and adds some variables that  emerged in the literature in
the context of this paper. Interpersonal  social trust as an alternative measure of social capital is added
to control for the claims of some social capital theories. Life  optimism is included because some
other social capital theorists,  e.g. Uslaner (1999), regard optimism as a common cause of both  social
participation and trust. Two variables expressing the sympathy  for leftist and rightist political parties
were also added. (A  factor analysis of Q44 produced these two underlying dimensions  of political
party sympathies.) Participation of respondents’  parents in social and political life was included
because it can  refer to both early socialization into a culture of participation  and inherited cultural
and social capital (a major basis of elite  reproduction).
The final model, Model 6, goes back to  the first hypothesis. It replaces the variable that is the subject
of analysis, i.e. membership in social organizations, with two  variables that separate those who had
an office in social organization  before their last election and those who are new as office-holders.  If
the political culture hypothesis is correct, ‘old’ office-holders, exposed  to longer experience of
pluralism, would make significantly more  effort to keep in touch with citizens than ‘new’ office-
holders.
Analysis
In  each model in which it was included, social capital as membership  in social organizations proved
to be a consistently significant  predictor. Even in Model 5, in which it was controlled for many
variables, it preserved a significant weight.
Comparing  Model 2 to Model 1, it is apparent that democratic values, allegedly  developed by civil
society organizations, do not contribute to  democratic performance. Model 5 shows that none of the
cultural  variables are significant in the presence of other factors. Model  6 raises doubts about the
socialization effects of groups membership.  ‘Old’ and ‘new’ office-holders are equally likely to
maintain  the information flow between voters and representatives. Both groups  perform significantly
better than those who are not leaders in  a social organization. The effect of membership does not
depend  on the length of time of membership. The political culture argument  is not supported by the
findings presented here.
The  accountability hypothesis, in contrast, is not rejected by the  evidence. Instead of an indirect,
developmental effect, a direct  formation of politician-members' opinion seems to take place in  civil
society organizations. Model 3 demonstrates that the inclusion  of the influence of civil society
organizations on political position  lowers the weight of the membership of respondents. The tentative
conclusion one can draw is that accountability mechanisms in CSOs  lead to a better political
performance of local representatives.
Findings  in Model 4 support the ambition hypothesis. All four variables  proved to be significant.
Mayors, professional politicians whose  everyday task is to keep in contact with citizens, and party
members,  who probably take politics more seriously, and those who prepared  for political work in
courses, all are more willing to communicate  with citizens. Political competition also encourages
democratic  practice. To gain competitive advantage over other competing political  forces, councilors
are forced to turn toward local citizens and  get to know better their will. Unmotivated politicians
could not  survive in such an environment.
In all models, municipality  size has a significant effect on representation activities. The  increasing
complexity of local society and the increasing gap between  voters and representatives require more
activities to maintain  communication. Explaining the large effect of the level of education  would
require more analysis.
The analysis repeated for  each component of the index resulted in more or less the same weights  and
significance levels. Both final models explain half of the  variance in the dependent variable, which
constitutes a high goodness  of fit in social science.
Table 8: Social capital and democratic performance
Dependent variable:
Democratic  activities of local
representatives
Model 1 Model  2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model  6
CSO membership .26*** .26*** .20*** .18*** .15***  
Old office-holder in CSO      .10***
New  office-holder in CSO      .09***
Support of political
participation
 ,05   .02 .02
Social trust     .03 .03
Support for leftist parties     .01 .01
Support for rightist parties     -.03 -.03
Participation of parents     .02 .02
Optimism     -.05 -.05
Mayor    .37*** .37*** .36***
Membership  in political party    .17*** .16*** .18***
Political education    .07** .07** .07**
Political  competition in local
government
   .12** .13*** .13***
CSO's  influence on
respondent's opinion
  .17***  .12*** .14***
Level  of education .21*** .21*** .18*** .16*** .14*** .14***
Age .10*** .09*** .10*** .07* .07** .07**
Gender (woman) -.06** -.06* -.03 .00 .02 .02
Population of municipality .32*** .32*** .31*** .21*** .20*** .19***
Adjusted  R2 .34 .34 .37 .51 .51 .51
Significance  of t-statistic: * p<0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p<0.01; N=732
Conclusion
The hypothesis based on the logic “membership - cooperation - participatory  attitudes - democratic
practices” did not gain much support in  the analysis. Attitudes toward participation and CSO
membership  do not affect each other’s effect on democratic practices, which  contradicts the logic
mentioned above. Political attitudes did  not seem to be an intervening variable between civil
organization  membership and representation activities. (Actually, there is no  significant variable of
social or political culture in the final  model.) It has also been seen that the length of time spent in
civil society does not influence its effect. This also challenges  the hypothesis, since more time should
yield a deeper commitment  to democratic practice.
Both the interpersonal accountability  and political ambitions arguments gained more support in the
analysis.  Characteristics that refer to political motivation clearly lower  the importance of civil
society membership in the models. This  suggests that political ambition influences both CSO
membership  and political role, which is the claim of the second hypothesis.  Accountability
mechanisms in CSOs also proved to be an important  factor in predicting the democratic performance
of local representatives, which  support the interpersonal accountability argument.
IV. Social Capital of Local Politicians and Local Government Performance
Measuring democratic performance
The book that started the  wave of social capital research has strong claims on the link between  social
capital and government performance. Putnam (1993) argues  that ‘the most important factor in
explaining good government  is the degree to which social and political life in a region approximates
the ideal of a civic community’ (1993: 120). Norms of trust and  reciprocity produced in small
communities ‘spill over’ into  the wider social and political realm and the improved cooperative
capacities  of such societies yield a more responsive and effective government.  Other researchers
(e.g. Stoner-Weiss 1997 in Russia, Milner and  Ersson 2000 in Sweden, Cusack 1997 in Germany)
replicated Putnam’s  research with more or less the same results.
The title  of Putnam’s book (Making Democratic Work) is misleading,  as Laitin (1995) rightly
claims, since his interest is in policy  performance (decisional efficacy, the success of projects, street-
level  responsiveness) and not democratic practice. Even non-democratic  governments can perform
well according to Putnam’s definition.
There is a tradition in political science rating the  level of democracy of political institutions.
Democratic performance usually  means the level of democracy in the political system. Most scholars
check a list of the formal features of a democracy, like free and  competitive elections, multiparty
system, universal suffrage, human  rights, political violence and the time since these features
characterize  the political system (see e.g. Cutright 1963, Huntington 1968,  Powell, 1982, Bollen &
Jackman 1985, Diamond 1992, Hadenius  1992, Rueschemeyer et al. 1992, Nations in Transit 1997,
Freedom  House’s annual report). In the case of sub-national governments,  these measures would
make little sense. Nonetheless, the values  behind them are useful for the measurement of democratic
performance  in local governments. In this vein, Crook and Manor (1998) include  the component of
democracy in their multidimensional model by assessing  the extent to which legal and political
norms, such as fairness,  probity, transparency, due process and political accommodation  are
embodied in the modes of operation of decentralized institutions in  four countries of Asia and Africa.
The everyday realization of democratic  norms is conceptualized as a part of the performance of
political  institutions. It is important to note that this paper deals with  performance measurement on
the institutional level, not on the  systemic one (as some of the listed democracy measures). Political
science has a long and venerable tradition of evaluating the (usually  democratic) performance of
political systems, including several  institutions from parliaments to political parties or the media.  It
is possible to compare the performance of local government systems.  This paper, however, focuses
on the institutional level and conceptualizes  the performance measurement of local governments.
Democratic  performance is perceived here as the capability of local government  to be open and to
include citizens in the decisions-making process.  It is measured by six questions relating to
democratic practices  toward (1) citizens, (2) media and (3) civil organizations.
Table 9: Indicators of democratic performance of local government
 General Budgeting
Citizenry Number of forums and public
hearings in 2000
Making draft budget public
still before the municipal
council adopted it
Local  civil  society Number  of civic  organizations
involved in local government
decision-making
Discussing draft budget with
civil society organizations
Local media Frequency of initiation of
contacts with journalists
Presentation of draft budget  to
civil society  organizations
The Local Government  Act in Hungary obliges municipalities to hold at least one public  hearing
each year. In addition to this compulsory hearing,  municipalities can hold as many forums and public
hearings as they  wish. Two percent of municipalities did not even hold the single  obligatory public
hearing in 2000, and two-thirds held one. One  in three local governments had more than one forum or
public hearing,  showing a higher performance. The number of such meetings with  local citizenry
indicates the openness of local government and  the willingness of local leaders to involve citizens in
the decision-making process.  The second, more concrete indicator of the openness of local
government  towards local citizenry was a question to CAOs as to whether or  not their municipalities
made the draft budget public before the  municipal council voted on it. One third of the surveyed
municipalities  open the way for the public discussion of the planning of their  most important annual
decision.
Two other indicators featured  the efforts to include voluntary associations in the decision-making  of
local government. A question in the Local Government Survey  asked information about the number
of civic organizations involved  in the preparation of local government decisions, e.g. as a consultant
or through membership in a committee of the local assembly. In municipalities  where there are civil
organizations, 62 percent of Hungarian local  governments did not involve any local civil society
organizations  and every tenth cooperated with the majority of local civil organizations.  The other
indicator concretized the collaboration in the budgetary  field. The LGS shows that 29 percent of
Hungarian municipalities  find it important to ask the opinion of local civil society organizations on
the distribution of collective resources.
Relations to  media, as one of the crucial institutions in local political life,  form the third set of
measures. The frequency of initiation of  contacts with journalists is a good indicator of the
relationship  between local government and local media. Where there is at least  one media outlet,
local governments attempt to keep contact with  it: Only 7 percent of respondents said their local
governments  never had contact with journalists, while one third of municipalities  approached
journalists at regular intervals. The other indicator  of media contacts is the question about the
presentation of draft  budget to journalists. One third of local governments presented  the draft budget
in 2000, while 63 percent did not (even if at  least one media outlet existed in municipality).
Table 10: Democratic performance of Hungarian local governments
 High
performance
Medium
performance
Low performance
Forums and  public
hearings
More  than 1
forum
47.0%
1 forum
51.7%
0 forum
1.8%
Making draft  budget
public
Yes
33.4%
 No
65.8%
Civic  organizations
involved in local
government decision-
making
More than half
of local  civil
organizations
9,6%
At least one
organization,  but
less than half of
them
28.2%
None (although
there are  civil
organizations)
62.3%
Discussion of  draft
budget with civil society
organizations
Yes
28.9%
 No (although
there are civil
organizations)
71.1%
Frequency  of  initiation
of contacts with
journalists
At regular
intervals
35.9
Occasionally
57.2%
Never (although
there are  local
media)
6.9%
Presentation  of  draft
budget to journalists
Yes
36.6%
 No  (although
there are local
media)
63.4%
Source: LGS 2001
Explanatory variables
A number of potentially useful variables  were included in the analysis. Chief executive officers,
respondents  of the Local Government Survey, were asked to indicate the number  of councilors who
had an office in a civil society organization.  The proportion of socially active representatives,
computed from  the information given by CAOs, served as the aggregate measure  of the social capital
of municipality councilors.
Three  variables assessed the strength of civil society. CAOs indicated  the number of civil society
organizations in the municipality.  This data is especially precise in smaller municipalities.
Respondents  also provided the number of media outlets with local coverage.  Both variables refer to
the level of organization of the local  society. Social capital research argues that citizens in civic
regions are more likely to assert their claims by organizing collective  actions.
Collective actions form an intervening variable  between the ecology of civil society and government
performance.  To test this claim, the Local Government survey collected information  about five types
of local collective political activities in the  year 2000 (see Table 11). Judging from our data, the
submission  of proposals by civic organizations took place in the largest proportion  of municipalities,
and requests for meetings was the second most  widespread tool used. Understandably, more
conflicting actions  such as demonstrations, petitions and challenging decisions at  courts were not so
generally employed. Although the frequency of  court cases ranks third, it occurred in only 5% of the
municipalities  surveyed. In almost half (49%) of the Hungarian municipalities  (usually small
settlements), none of these actions took place in  2000.
Table 11: Citizen participation in local politics
 % of surveyed
municipalities  it was
used
mean  frequency mean frequency
where happened
Public  demonstrations 3,0% 0,05 1,7
Petitions 13,0% 0,16 1,2
Requesting  meetings 24,0% 1,17 13,2
Challenging  local
government decisions
5,0% 1,00 2,1
Civil  society  proposals 37,0% 1,63 4,4
Source: LGS 2001
Three variables controlled  for the socio-economic milieu in which local governments function.  The
simplest, but usually most powerful variable is municipality  size, measured by the number of
inhabitants living on the territory  of the local government. The association between socio-economic
development and democracy is empirically extremely well-established  (although the explanations for
this relationship are from being  systematic and convincing), so socio-economic development also
has a place in a multivariable model. It is measured by an index  of four measures (number of cars,
private telephone lines, active  enterprises and unemployed people per 1000 inhabitants). Table  12
shows the results of principal component analysis about the  composition of the development index.
Table 12: Development index
Variable Eigen-
value
Percent of
variance
Factor
loadings
Number of cars  per  1000 inhabitants 2.51 62.7 .89
Number of  private telephones per  1000
inhabitants
.68 17.0 -.70
Number of active  enterprises per  1000 inhabitants .52 13.0 .74
Number of  unemployed per 1000 inhabitants .29 7.3 .83
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin = .75;  Bartlett significance = .00000
Finally, a set  of questions indicates the level of social tensions in municipality.  The measure of
social tension is the mean of these six variables.
Table 13: Level of tension in municipality
To what extent  do the following differences cause social tensions
between  people in your community? (Scale 1-7)
Mean
Differences in  income 4.0
Differences in  religious beliefs or affiliation 1.5
Differences in  political views 2.1
Differences in  ethnic origins 2.4
Differences  between parts of the municipality 1.8
Differences  between those who always lived here and those who moved
here only recently
2.5
Multivariate analysis
Table  14 shows the results of linear regression analysis in four models.  It is striking that the
embeddedness of local representatives in  the local society has a significant and large effect in all
models.  This effect decreases when other features of civil society are  also included, but remains the
strongest predictor.
The  civil society argument is supported by the data, as both the number  of CSOs and media outlets
have a significant and quite large effect.  What is interesting is that media have a bigger weight than
associations.  The political, ‘watchdog’ function seems more important than  a civil society that
creates social trust and other cultural phenomena.  The activity of local society is also a good
predictor of local  government performance.
Modernization theory is also supported,  since socio-economic development has a separate effect even
if  civil society variables are controlled for. The model explains  43 percent of the variance in the
democratic performance of local  government, which is a very good result.
Table 14: Social capital and local government performance (regression analysis)
Dependent variable: Democratic
performance of local government
Model 1 Model 2 Model  3 Model 4
Proportion of representatives with CSO
membership
.40*** .29*** .25*** .23***
Number of CSOs in municipality  .21*** .16*** .15***
Number of media outlets in municipality  .31*** .25*** .22***
Actions of civil society   .21*** .20***
Social  tensions in municipality    .00
Socio-economic  development    .12***
Population of municipality .34*** .01 .00 .00
Adjusted R2 .28 .39 .42 .43
Significance of t-statistic: * p<0.10 ** p< 0.05  *** p<0.01; N=639
Conclusion
On the societal level, social capital theory works extremely well.  Citizens in more civic
municipalities, to use Putnam’s language,  are able to make effective demands to governments
through their  cooperation. The density of civil society has a strong effect on  the readiness of local
governments to inform their citizens and  to ascertain their opinion.
The measure of the social  capital of councilors adds much to the understanding of the reasons  for
why certain local governments are more democratic than others.  This effect, however, exists when
civil society measures are controlled  for. Leaders participating in social organizations produce more
democracy,  independently of the ‘civicness’ of the local community. Further  research should clarify
whether this independent effect is produced  by the imperfect measurement of social capital or, as the
previous  argument suggests, the social capital of municipality councilors  has other, more powerful
determinants than ‘civicness’.
Conclusion
The central question which this paper addresses is to what extent the  social capital of local
representatives contributes to democratic  performance in Hungarian local governments. Social capital
is operationalized  as a function of membership in a civil society organization, although  social trust is
also considered in the analysis. Democratic performance  is operationalized as the effort to consult
with citizens. Results  show that, even if several other potential factors are also included  in the
analysis, the social capital of local representatives has  a significant effect on their individual
democratic performance, and  their aggregate social capital has a similar effect on the performance  of
local government.
A cultural explanation of these relationships  did not contribute to a better understanding. The social
capital  of local politicians had no, or minimal effect on democratic values,  and more democratic
leaders do not make an increased effort to consult with their citizens. Civic culture cannot serve as an
intervening  factor. Political ambitions and interpersonal accountability in  social groups would seem,
potentially, to better explain the findings.  Career-motivated politicians join social organizations and
do more for fulfilling their duties as representatives. Therefore,  the correlation between democratic
performance and social capital  is spurious. Interpersonal accountability is a potential by-product  of
group linkages. Face-to-face interactions imply an element of  political accountability, especially in
civil society organizations  with a mission of influencing political life.
To test  these hypotheses, future data collection and analysis should focus  on separating politics-
oriented social organizations from others,  such as cultural, sport or educational organizations.
Moreover,  it should generate more knowledge about the level of accountability  and should also
identify the motivations for joining a social organization.  This would further assist in refining the
analysis of the meaning  of the membership of local councilors in civil society organizations.
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